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Summary: In order to prescribe adequate remedies to treat the current finan-
cial crisis one has to understand what in the first place went wrong. An age
ago, older generations wrote that disease could not be cured without an accu-
rate diagnosis. In contrast to mainstream “efficient markets hypothesis” we
argue that Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis gives numerous valuable
insights into sources and possible consequences of current global financial 
crisis. Furthermore, two decades ago Hyman P. Minsky predicted possible
developments and perils of ever growing process of securitization of illiquid
assets.
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“For Ponzi units, the cash flows from operations are not suffi-
cient to fulfill either repayment of principle or the interest due 
on outstanding debts by their cash flows from operations. Such 
units can sell assets or borrow. Borrowing to pay interest or 
selling assets to pay interest (and even dividends) on common 
stocks lowers the equity of a unit, even as it increases liabilities 
and the prior commitment of future incomes...” 
 
Hyman P. Minsky (1992), p. 7. 
 
 
For decades now, mainstream academic circles [proponents of Eugen Fama’s (1970) 
“efficient markets hypothesis”], zealously supported by Wall Street high rollers, have 
been claiming that self-regulated markets led by Smith’s “invisible hand” are the 
optimal mechanism for rational and productive allocation of scant resources to the 
most productive uses. In this view, ups and downs (boom-bust episodes) are conse-
quence of an exogenous shock (external to market processes), most frequently, un-
suitable and clumsy public policy interventions. If unanticipated exogenous shock 
disrupted normal functioning of markets, corrective forces that at least in the long run 
restore market clearing conditions, would be activated. Naturally, because markets 
know best, there was no room for worry. The prescription for a stabile and rapid 
growth of the economy and living standards is pretty simple: deregulation and liber-
alization of financial flows and world trade, i.e. minimization of government control 
and market regulation.  210  Ognjen Radonjić and Miodrag Zec 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2010, 2, pp. 209-224 
However, seemingly suddenly, contrary to orthodox theory of efficient finan-
cial markets, in August 2007, reality brutally bit. Financial markets came to a sudden 
stop. Although the first signs of accumulated difficulties became visible in 2006 
when house prices peaked, in March 2007 when debtors in subprime mortgage mar-
ket started to declare bankruptcy, and in July 2007 when big banks found that they 
could not sell existing buyout loans, the “Minsky moment” (term coined by Paul 
McCulley 2008) finally arrived in August 2007. Monetary authorities and main-
stream economists were stunned and surprised. Crisis erupted in subprime mortgage 
market and afterwards, as quick as lightning, it spread to other U.S. markets and the 
markets worldwide. Interest rate spreads soared and panic caught equity markets. 
(Charles J. Whalen 2007; Charles R. Morris 2008; George Soros 2008).                  
Today, when concerned voices ask themselves what went wrong desperately 
seeking financial help from government, and when irresponsible government offi-
cials wash their hands of responsibility, Hyman Minsky would not be neither stunned 
nor surprised. Minsky (1919-1996) was born in Chicago, and although, he special-
ized in theory of business cycles his economic thought was widely neglected during 
his life. As one of the most prominent followers of John Maynard Keynes, Minsky 
rejected Patinkin’s neoclassical synthesis and Smithian view of the world as invalid 
and, after all, harmful for those practitioners who uncritically embrace it. The Finan-
cial Instability Hypothesis (FIH) is the result of Minsky’s long and thorough studying 
of unbalanced development of closed developed capitalist economy. The goal of his 
research was to find answers to questions that bothered him for so long: Why were 
developed capitalist countries with sophisticated financial systems prone to depres-
sions and why was the equilibrium only a temporary state? In order to find right an-
swers, he confronted  neoclassical world of risk and resurrected a neglected and 
wrongly interpreted Keynes’ theory of investment under conditions of fundamental 
uncertainty, as well as his uncompleted theory of business cycles.  
 
1. The Great Depression and Keynes’ Speculative Financial 
Markets 
 
Years following the end of the World War I were years of accelerated economic 
growth and development in developed western countries. However, after only two 
years of peace, the American economy was caught in a severe recession that fortu-
nately ended in 1922. In next seven years, boom continued at a pace unimaginable 
until that very moment. Purchasing power of consumers, production, productivity, 
investment, profits and dividends grew continually and number of unemployed de-
creased drastically. Excessive optimism of market players was justified by funda-
mental changes in business environment, such as establishment of global free trade, 
technological inventions, increase in productivity, elimination of inflation etc. 
Widely accepted opinion in business and financial circles was that an era of stability 
was coming and that business cycles were only a matter of past. It seemed that no 
one was bothered with the fact that in the period between 1922-1929 financial mar-
kets grew twelve times faster than the real sector. That was an era of the brave new 
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However, seemingly out of the blue, in October 1929, financial markets crashed and 
the Great Depression came to the scene. During the Great Depression all crucial mac-
roeconomic variables significantly declined. All the way until the beginning of the 
World War II, western economies were in chains of impossible – high unemploy-
ment and idle resources. In his seminal book The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money John Maynard Keynes, eminent English economist and philoso-
pher, offered an answer to the question why modern entrepreneur and essentially 
monetary capitalistic systems are prone to crises and disruptive behavior. He rejected 
Say’s Law, the (neo)classical theory of money neutrality, and the necessary 
(neo)classical tools aimed at proving the hypothesis that in the long run economic 
systems naturally strive to equilibrium. On the other side, in Keynes view, there is 
not such a thing as a stable equilibrium. Financially sophisticated economic systems 
move continuously through time and any state, whether it be a state of rest, expan-
sion, boom, deflation or stagnation is transitional: ”Since we claim to have shown in 
the preceding chapters what determines the volume of employment at any time, it 
follows, if we are right, that our theory must be capable of explaining the phenomena 
of the trade cycle. If we examine the details of any actual instance of the trade cycle, 
we shall find that it is highly complex and that every element in our analysis will be 
required for its complete explanation. …By a cyclical movement we mean that as the 
system progresses in, e.g. the upward direction, the forces propelling it upwards at 
first gather force and have a cumulative effect on one another but gradually lose their 
strength until at a certain point they tend to be replaced by forces operating in the 
opposite direction.” (Keynes 1936, pp. 341-342). Thus, in Keynes’ world, modern 
financially sophisticated capitalistic systems of production, distribution, exchange 
and consumption are not perfect and stable self-correcting mechanism, but funda-
mentally flawed. As Keynes pointed out, the reason of its inherent instability lies in 
its structure and relations established between investments, financial markets, output 
and employment. Namely, asset valuation determinates investment path, which, on 
the other hand, crucially determines employment and output. However, due to fun-
damental uncertainty, i.e. unstable expectations and speculative orientation of unin-
formed agents, asset prices are liable to sudden and wild fluctuations. In that way, 
unnecessary investment projects might be undertaken, which, in the event of some 
unanticipated change, could be sufficient reason to trigger a crisis of confidence lead-
ing to a severe output and employment downturn.    
In his dual price theory, Keynes defined conditions that will lead to new in-
vestments. Supply price of capital goods (price of capital goods that have not been 
produced yet) is based on short term expectations and is, consequently, stable. On the 
other hand, demand price of capital goods (price of existing capital goods given in 
the price of securities that represents legal right over profits that capital goods gener-
ate) is based on long run unstable expectations that go deep into uncertain, distant, 
vague, and misty future. In his concept of a fundamentally uncertain future, Keynes 
clashed with neoclassical theory by arguing that future is not preprogrammed and 
determined, and that our past experiences are not a reliable guide for making invest-
ment decisions. (Sheila C. Dow 2005; Donald Gillies 2005; Gay T. Meeks 2005; 
Jochen Runde 2005; Ognjen Radonjić 2007, 2009). In Keynes’ opinion, there is no 212  Ognjen Radonjić and Miodrag Zec 
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such thing as a preprogrammed future, i.e. a future that is going to happen no matter 
what we, as participants do, and no matter which action we chose to take. Keynes 
criticized the classical and neoclassical assumption that expectations were “...given 
in a definite and calculable form. The calculus of probability ...was supposed to be 
capable of reducing uncertainty to the same calculable status as that of certainty it-
self.” (Keynes 1937, pp. 212-213). Keynes’ concept of fundamental uncertainty tells 
us that there is no future that is waiting to be discovered. In their economic activity, 
humans make choices and take different actions every day. In that way, agent’s 
choices do matter, because we shape the future by making decisions and taking ac-
tions. The future is nonergodic, i.e. by making decisions and taking actions we create 
the future. In contrast to neoclassical and mainstream financial theory, Keynes argues 
that there is no way that we can at a present moment attach any numerical probability 
to infinite number of future outcomes we can imagine. What is more, many possible 
outcomes are unimaginable at the present moment. Necessary conditions for the re-
alization of outcomes that we cannot imagine in present moment will be created at 
some future moment and result from our decisions. In real world, the kind of uncer-
tainty that is essential in investment decision making is that about which “...there is 
no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply 
do not know.” (Ibid, p. 214). He then asks, how we, faced with uncertain future, 
where our past experiences and statistical analysis of past data are not a reliable 
guide to the future, make decisions “…in a manner which saves our faces as rational 
economic men?” (Ibid, p. 214). In a dynamic business environment conventionally 
“…We assume that the present is much more serviceable guide to the future than a 
candid examination of past would show to be hitherto. …We assume that the existing 
state of opinion as expressed in prices and the character of existing output is based on 
a correct summing up of future prospects, so that we can accept it as such unless and 
until something new and relevant comes into picture. …Knowing that our individual 
judgment is worthless, we endeavor to fall back on the judgment of the rest of the 
world which is perhaps better informed.” (Ibid, p. 214). Due to the fact that the exit 
from financial markets is (seemingly) always open and since the future is fundamen-
tally uncertain it is rational for owners of securities to form short-term expectations 
and pursue capital gains, and because they do not have the needed information to 
make reliable forecasts, it is rational, although not optimal, to extrapolate the present 
situation into the indefinite future (the first two conventions): “It would be foolish, in 
forming our expectations, to attach great weight to matters which are very uncertain. 
It is reasonable, therefore, to be guided to a considerable degree by the facts about 
which we feel somewhat confident, even though they may be less decisively relevant 
to the issue than other facts about which our knowledge is vague and scanty. For this 
reason the facts of the existing situation enter, in a sense disproportionately, into the 
formation of our long-term expectations; our usual practice being to take the existing 
situation and to project it into the future, modified only to the extent that we have 
more or less definite reasons for expecting a change.” (Keynes 1936, p. 188). Also, 
agents know that there is no predestined future, and that they create the future by 
forming expectations and taking actions in light of these expectations. In other 
words, financial markets are momentum driven and led by self-fulfilling processes. 213  Subprime Crisis and Instability of Global Financial Markets 
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Namely, if an agent thinks that the average agent thinks that the market will rise, in 
anticipation of an increase in securities prices, he will, in order to make profits, buy 
securities at that very moment when they are cheap. If other agents also form the 
same or similar expectation, they will all, in attempt to be one step ahead, on the try 
to buy securities on the simultaneous basis thereby pushing prices up. Financial mar-
kets are reflexive and it is utterly important to try to figure out what your competitors 
think because, in the end, expectations and expectations-based actions create the fu-
ture course of development of markets. In a moment of brilliance, Keynes compared 
the process of decision-making in financial markets with beauty contests: 
“...professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which 
the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, 
the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to 
the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to 
pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks like-
liest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the prob-
lem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best 
of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion 
genuinely thinks the prettiest.” (Ibid, p. 195). Consequently “...it is not sensible to 
pay 25 for an investment of which you believe the prospective yield to justify a value 
of 30, if you also believe that the market will value it at 20 three months hence.” 
(Ibid, p. 194). Keynes warns that we should not believe that the valuation of securi-
ties created in this game of outwit between professional investors and speculators has 
any long-term validity because it is “...a game ... of Musical Chairs — a pastime in 
which he is victor... who secures a chair for himself when the music stops. These 
games can be played with zest and enjoyment, though all the players know ... that 
when the music stops some of the players will find themselves unseated.” (Ibid, p. 
195). This is, of course, Keynes’ answer to question why are financial market’s play-
ers prone to highly speculative activities.  
Consistently, because in the environment of incalculable future we “simply do 
not know” our expectations and asset prices are “based on so flimsy foundation” 
(Keynes 1937, p. 214) and are consequently “subject to sudden and violent changes.” 
(Ibid, pp. 214-215). On the other hand, changes in expectations change agent’s li-
quidity preference. When agents anticipate some changes in environment, but “…are 
very uncertain as to what precise form these changes will take, then their confidence 
will be weak…” (Keynes 1936, p. 188) and their liquidity preference will rise 
sharply. Consequently, sudden and significant simultaneous shift of agent’s funds 
from less liquid assets (financial assets, capital assets, land, real estate, arts etc.) to-
wards money could cause aggregate demand deficit that may, if disequilibrium forces 
are activated, drag system down into a deep depression.  
In Keynes’ dual price theory, investments will increase when ratio of demand 
price and supply price of capital goods is above 1. It appears that Keynes (1936) im-
plicitly assumed, as Tobin did explicitly in hpis q theory, that if ratio of demand price 
and supply price of capital goods is above 1, investments will be financed. Some 
questions that Keynes did not answer, and are in the focus of Minsky’s FIH, are what 
determines state of expectations at any given time, and why do changes in expecta-
tions occur and how investment is financed? 214  Ognjen Radonjić and Miodrag Zec 
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2. Financial Instability Hypothesis 
 
In Minsky’s words the FIH is a “model of capitalist economy which does not rely 
upon exogenous shocks to generate business cycles of varying severity.” (Minsky 
1992, p. 8). Minsky, as well as Keynes, rejected assumption that money is neutral, 
and in his theory the method used to finance positions in different assets is of critical 
importance. The world of economic relations is very complex and dynamic and con-
sists of networks of mutually connected and dependent balance sheets of households, 
corporations, financial institutions and government. Balance sheets are composed of 
assets, liabilities, and cash flows that validate liabilities. When one party wishes to 
undertake some costly investment project it rarely has a sufficient amount of money 
to execute it on its own. It needs external funds and usually gets connected with 
bankers (or financial institutions in general), which are “merchants of debt” (Ibid, p. 
6). The real problem is that at the moment when a lender (merchant of debt) and a 
borrower (party that buys capital or financial assets) get into a contract neither party, 
due to fundamental uncertainty, can be sure that the investment project will, in the 
future, generate sufficient cash flow to make good on debt that is used to finance in-
vestment. If the borrower fails, the lender, who now has some bad debt in its assets, 
might not be able to meet its obligations against other parties. In that way, a snowball 
of failures might be activated, which, in the absence of implementation of highly ex-
pansive fiscal and monetary policy, might end in deep economic depression, i.e. debt 
deflation episode.  
The FIH consists of two theorems. The first is that a system can both be stable 
and unstable. The second is that during a prolonged period of prosperity, conditions 
emerge that cause a system to transition from an environment of stablility towards 
environment of unstable financial relations. The core thesis of the FIH is that stability 
is destabilizing because, in an environment of fundamental uncertainty, ignorant hu-
man beings have no other choice but to extrapolate stability into infinity. Naturally, 
with calendar flow of time, when agents extrapolate stability into infinity they be-
come more confident and, as their aim is to pursue ever higher profits, they become 
more and more willing to increase their liabilities relative to income. In that way, 
agents accumulate more risky debt structures.  
On the basis of the margin of safety (the difference between expected cash in-
flow that an investment will generate and the sum of financing costs and operating 
expenses) Minsky (1986, 1992) explained the difference between three kinds of debt 
structures: hedge, speculative and Ponzi units. Net present value of hedge units is 
always positive. Speculative units are expected to generate cash flow that will not at 
any future moment be sufficient to pay out debt commitments. At some time in the 
future, generated cash flow will be sufficient to meet interest, but not the principal 
commitment. Finally, during most of the time or during whole period of life of the 
loan, the margin of safety of Ponzi units is non-existent. On the basis of euphoric 
expectations, Ponzi units get into debt today in expectation of high profits that will 
be realized in some, unknown future moment (high capital gains). Ponzi units are not 
able to meet its principle and interest obligations. To keep Ponzi units afloat, prices 
of assets must continue to rise. Refusal of emission of new short-term debt for fi-
nancing existing debt obligations leads Ponzi units, in the short run, into bankruptcy.  215  Subprime Crisis and Instability of Global Financial Markets 
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According to the FIH, the higher the proportion of hedge units, the more stable 
the system. On the other hand, the higher the proportion of speculative and Ponzi 
units, the more that dominant forces will further destabilize system in the event of an 
endogenously or exogenously generated shock (example of endogenously generated 
shock is a failure of some prominent financial institution or corporation and of ex-
ogenous sudden switch to restrictive monetary policy by the central bank in order to 
constraint inflation). In a word, after a prolonged period of prosperity, the system 
becomes dominated by speculative and Ponzi units and is, consequently, fragile, i.e. 
less capable of absorbing shocks, so shocks are more likely to induce financial crisis. 
As debt increases and liquidity stretches, the maximum interest rate that the system is 
able to bear declines, and units become increasingly vulnerable to even a small in-
crease in interest rates or/and unanticipated fall in profits. 
Beside stability, competition among “merchants of debt” is another factor that 
induces agents to accept more and more risky behavior. Ruthless competition among 
financial institutions in their battle for potential clients ends in an eternal process of 
creating financial innovations. With proliferation of financial innovations, the avail-
able amount of finance goes up, which increases the demand for existing assets push-
ing up their prices. Because assets serve as collateral, rising asset prices allow even 
more debt to be emitted, thereby further increasing demand for finance. Therefore, 
financial markets are not mean-reverting, but momentum-driven (reflexive). A key 
concept of financial innovations is to find new ways to finance investment and 
speculative activity which are cheaper than existing ones. This implies that with the 
proliferation of financial innovation, in times of euphoria and expansion, part of the 
financial market that is under regulation of monetary authorities shrinks. In that way, 
moving of the system towards more fragile financial relations is supported by process 
in “which more traditional and benign borrowing is steadily replaced by borrowing 
that depends on new debt to repay existing loans.” (George Magnus 2007, p. 7).  
 
3. Development of Financial Fragility 
 
Minsky’s analysis of development of financial fragility with calendar flow of time 
starts in the period of recovery of the system after a financial breakdown that took 
place in not too distant past. This is the period when animal spirits are diminished, 
the level of investment and debt to equity are low whereas profit to interest cover and 
margin of safety are high. Risk premium and consequently risk aversion are high. 
An outside shock to the system is necessary in order to shift from a track of 
slow to a track of accelerating economic and investment growth. The nature of an 
outside shock powerful enough to cause displacement of the system, and conse-
quently dramatic change in profits horizons and expectations of agents, varies from 
one crisis to another (such a shock might be some revolutionary invention, some po-
litical event or unexpected change in monetary policy, sudden financial deregulation 
and liberalization, new exotic financial instruments, etc...). Be as it may, displace-
ment shock initiates sharp rise in agent’s optimism, animal spirits are ignited, debt-
financed investment activity and debt to equity ratio rise, an profit to interest cover 
and margins of safety fall. Risk premium and system liquidity falls whereas demand 
for money (credit) and, consequently, interest rates increase. The interest rate in-216  Ognjen Radonjić and Miodrag Zec 
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crease is not significant, because part of the growing demand for money is covered 
by creation of financial innovations (spreading of financial innovations through the 
system causes rise in the velocity of money). Also, the inflow of fresh money into 
financial markets (from domestic and/or foreign sources) is dynamic ("merchants of 
debt” are now willing to increase supply of money because they share increased op-
timism of investors), prices of securities rise, the investment ratio rises, and the gen-
eral level of financial speculation increases. In this phase of rising optimism as “...a 
recovery approaches full employment, the current generation of economic soothsay-
ers will proclaim that the business cycle has been banished from the land and a new 
era of permanent prosperity has been inaugurated. Debts can be taken on because the 
new policy instruments - be it the Federal Reserve System or fiscal policy - together 
with the greater sophistication of the economic scientists advising on policy assure 
that crises and debt deflations are now things of the past.” (Minsky 1975, p. 126). In 
that way, rising optimism evolves into excessive one.  
Excessive optimism or euphoria in an environment of fundamental uncertainty 
is expected, because, according to Irving Fisher, although economic variables incline 
towards stable equilibrium “…exact equilibrium thus sought is seldom reached and 
never maintained. New disturbances are, humanly speaking, sure to occur, so that, in 
actual fact, any variable is almost always above or below the ideal equilibrium.” 
(Fisher 1933, p. 339). As Fisher further concludes, excessive optimism and self-
confidence might cause underestimation of investments risks leading to excessive 
indebtedness. In Fisher’s opinion, over-investment, over-speculation and over-
confidence are not a serious danger to stability per se, but in combination with over-
indebtedness: “Thus over-investment and over-speculation are often important; but 
they would have far less serious results were they not conducted with borrowed 
money. …I fancy that over-confidence seldom does any great harm except when, as, 
and if, it beguiles its victims into debt.” (Ibid, p. 341). When the time comes, the cre-
ated debt structure will not be justified by realized profits.  
As time passes, euphoric expectations “beguiles its victims” more and more 
into debt. In time, debts begin to rise faster than profits. Among liabilities, the fastest 
growing items are short-term debts. Over-confident entrepreneurs are sure of grow-
ing profit rates, and prefer a short-term debt because it is cheaper than a long-term 
one. The debt to equity ratio rises further, the profit to interest cover falls, the margin 
of safety is melting, and in growing number of cases turns negative, the liquidity of 
the system is falling, and in the end the supply of credit and prices of securities in-
crease exponentially. Due to decreased liquidity and devaluation of highly liquid debt 
instruments (optimistic agents are now more prone to risky investments) the interest 
rate rises. However, this rise does not decelerate boom, because in anticipation of 
high speculative capital gains (which far exceed prevailing interest rates), optimistic 
agents are more than willing to take on more debts. In other words, during the period 
of market euphoria, elasticity of demand for credit with respect to interest rate de-
creases. Furthermore, domination of highly speculative Ponzi units in later phases of 
market euphoria additionally put upward pressure on interest rates.        
In time, as the period of euphoria continues, the system is becoming more and 
more fragile and speculative and Ponzi units are becoming dominant. In a word, fra-217  Subprime Crisis and Instability of Global Financial Markets 
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gility emerges endogenously in an upward phase of the business cycle. In this situa-
tion, if restrictive monetary policy were implemented (which would rise interest 
rates) in order to constrain inflation, the number of speculative and Ponzi units would 
tend to increase in relation to hedge units. When the system is fragile, in an environ-
ment of monetary constraint “…speculative units will become Ponzi units and the net 
worth of previously Ponzi units will quickly evaporate.” (Minsky 1992, p. 8). Also, if 
the rising of assets’ prices stops, Ponzi units would not be able to increase their debt 
and would be forced to sell assets thereby activating downward asset prices spiral.    
This state of euphoria and the market booming phase is, however, temporary. 
As Minsky argues, financing “...is often based upon an assumption 'that the existing 
state of affairs will continue indefinitely' (a quotation from Keynes, remarks by Min-
sky), but of course this assumption proves false. During a boom the existing state is 
the boom with its accompanying capital gains and asset revaluations. During both a 
debt-deflation and a stagnant recession the same conventional assumption of the pre-
sent always ruling is made; the guiding wisdom is that debts are to be avoided, for 
debts lead to disaster. ...But in truth neither the boom, nor the debt deflation, nor the 
stagnation, and certainly not a recovery or full-employment growth can continue in-
definitely. Each state nurtures forces that lead to its own destruction.” (Minsky 1975, 
p. 126). 
In the end, in an environment of fundamental uncertainty where we have no 
other choice but to extrapolate stability, disappointment is inevitable. Due to eupho-
ria, investments are “...prompted by expectations which are destined to disappoint-
ment” (Keynes 1936, p. 348). Consequently, as agents notice that expectations were 
over-optimistic and as realized profits are disappointing, they start to protect their 
position by attempting to raise their liquidity. To increase liquidity, financial media-
tors are forced to reduce the supply of credit to hedge and speculative units (in that 
case speculative units tend to transform into Ponzi units) and to stop revolving short-
term credit to Ponzi units. Risk aversion and, resultantly, cost of capital rise sharply. 
Existing and newly established Ponzi units (which emerged as a consequence of 
transformation of speculative units) will, in attempts to meet their debt commitments, 
decrease production in order to cut expenses, decrease inventory, sell their product at 
a significant discount, lay off workers, and “make position by selling out position” 
(selling of various assets and physical capital in possession; Minsky 1992). The in-
tensified selling of assets by Ponzi units (securities, real estate, arts, land, commodi-
ties, etc.) causes at first a steadiness of prices (the rise is stopped), immediately fol-
lowed by a sharp fall in prices of securities, real estate, arts etc. The markets have 
gone down. If in this downward movement, authorities do not implement expansive 
fiscal and monetary policy, debt-deflation will come to the scene.  
 
4. Postwar Calm, Securitization and Fall of Ponzi Subprime 
Market  
 
In order to prevent crises similar in magnitude to the one that hit developed countries 
at the end of the 1920s, the US Government put in place numerous measures aiming 
at purging speculator out of the system and, consistently, regaining the power of pro-218  Ognjen Radonjić and Miodrag Zec 
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ducers and consumers. Also, developed countries established the Breton Woods sys-
tem of fixed exchange rates and rigorous capital controls trying to preserve financial 
stability after the WWII. In the next two decades, system was stable and seemingly 
prosperous. Market players and government officials were optimistic and confident 
because, once again, they thought, due to the Government’s fine-tuning policy, crises 
were unlikely to take place. However, at the end of the 1960s, the system revealed 
the first signs of distress. Considerable power concentrated in hands of Big Govern-
ment, Big Labor and monopolies, fueled a cost-push inflation. Naturally, an envi-
ronment of high and persistent inflation, in which big players expected bailing-out in 
case of financial difficulties, encouraged debt financing of investments. In an envi-
ronment of positive interest rates, the loan business was profitable, and consequently, 
merchant of debts where stimulated to search for new and unregulated methods of 
investment financing. Securitization was one of them, and Minsky was well aware of 
this process. Seeds of destruction had been sown into a seemingly stabile environ-
ment. Money rentiers rode again.  
Around two decades ago, in his Memo on Securitization Minsky had recog-
nized potential perils of the securitization process. There are three hallmarks of his 
view on securitization: 
  “That which can be securitized, will be securitized.” (Minsky 1987, p. 2]. 
  “Securitization lowers the weight of that part of the financing structure that 
the central bank is committed to protect.” (Ibid, p. 3). 
  “The investment banker hires ‘econometricians’ or financial economists to 
demonstrate that the risks of default on interest and principle of some class 
of the securities it proposes to issue are so small that these instruments de-
serve to have an investment rating that implies a low interest rates.” (Ibid, 
p. 4).  
In Minsky’s opinion, securitization was a response of highly regulated finan-
cial institutions, such as banks and thrifts, to the restrictive monetary policy of Fed 
chair Paul Volcker, which was aimed at permanent termination of inflation in early 
1980s. A high fed funds rate put into subordinated position the financial institutions 
which were subjected to interest rate ceilings (Regulation Q). They could not attract 
new funds and make profits on the basis of the difference between earnings on assets 
and deposit interest rate obligations. Also, Minsky calculated that, in order to sur-
vive, banks and other regulated financial institutions should reach a required profit 
margin between interest rates earned on assets and interest rate paid on liabilities of 
about 450 basis points. In other words, due to the fact that they were subjected to 
reserve and capital adequacy requirements and due to costly relationship banking, 
regulated financial players became not only institutions that generated low profits, 
but institutions that were at the verge of bankruptcy. In order to survive and compete 
with unregulated low cost financial players (those that were not subjected to restric-
tive regulations and did not practice costly relationship banking), regulated financial 
institutions found a way out in securitization, i.e. an originate-and-distribute banking 
model. Namely, banks create mortgage loans and then pull them together and sell 
them to investment bankers, who further, on the basis of the pooled mortgages, create 
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obligations), slicing them into different risk tranches to suit investors’ needs. In that 
way, regulated financial institutions moved mortgages off their balance sheet, and 
replaced interest earnings as primary source of profits with fee incomes generated in 
the business of originating loans, assessing risks and, if necessary, servicing the 
mortgages. In that way, a hazardous incentive structure had been created. Because 
banks, thrifts, and mortgage brokers moved mortgages off their balance sheets, they 
were not interested in quality of loans, i.e. the future solvency of borrowers. Because 
they earned fee incomes, they were primarily interested in through-put, never mind 
the solvency prospects of the borrower. (Randall L. Wray 2007; Jan Kregel 2008a, b; 
McCulley 2009; Eric Tymoigne 2009a, b).  
Consequently, the subprime mortgage market bloomed. Borrowers with less 
documentation required (low doc loans), without necessary documentation (no doc 
loans), the ones who lied about their incomes and assets (liar loans) and finally bor-
rowers with no income, no job, no assets (NINJA loans), all of a sudden, became 
eligible customers. Edward Chancellor (2008) argues that subrime borrowers simply 
could not refuse lenders’ generous offer. Namely, in terms of options, lenders were 
selling call options to insolvent people (credit contracts with low initial payments and 
interest rate and low or non-existent down payment) for free, on assets expected to 
rise in value. With rising house values, borrowers were able to increase their debt. At 
the same time, lenders sold put options to insolvent borrowers for free, so that if the 
value of a house falls, borrower could put back the house to the lender. McCulley 
(2008) suggests that borrowers with no documentation, no incomes, no down pay-
ment, with teaser interest rates are borrowers who are one level above Ponzi units. 
He calls them Ponzi squared units, because they are not only incapable to cover their 
principal and interest rate obligations out of their cash flow, but also, they do not 
have any stake in this kind of contract. 
At the same time, mortgage officers were stimulated to lie and deceive poten-
tial customers, because they were richly rewarded if they succeed to push loans with 
unfavorable terms, which increased value of mortgage backed securities. (Wray 
2007). In that way, financial innovations with low or no down payment found their 
way to ignorant and, often, deceived borrowers – “interest-only” loans and “option 
adjustable rate” mortgages (option ARMs) with initially low “teaser” interest rates 
but with very high reset rates later. (Ibid). And of course, as long as prices of houses 
keep rising (collateral) and/or interest rates are kept low, a Ponzi unit lives and in-
crease its debts (for instance to refinance mortgage loans or rises in home equity 
loans). 
On the other hand, investment banks had been buying pools of subprime 
mortgages massively, and then, by securitizing them, were selling great number of 
various exotic mortgage backed securities to profits hungry big financial institutions. 
To find buyers for junk, investment banks were forced to apply financial alchemy, or, 
in other words, credit enhancement strategies.  
Firstly, on the basis of pools of subprime mortgages they created securities 
that belonged to different tranches in order to meet different risk-return preferences 
of investors. For example, if historical analysis of, we must emphasize, unrepresenta-
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more than 10%, securities that were backed by subprime mortgage pool would be 
divided into AAA or senior tranche (70%), mezzanine or junior tranche (20%) and 
subordinated tranche (10%). Now, owners of AAA tranche would be paid first from 
income that was generated by underlying pool of mortgages, i.e. if some borrowers 
default, owners of subordinated and BBB tranche would be first to feel it. In that 
way, thanks to “overcollateralization”, it appeared, that AAA or senior tranche were 
quite safe securities and consequently suitable investment for big financial players 
like insurance companies and pension funds. (Wray 2007; Michael Mah-Hui Lim 
2008). What is more, thanks to short historical experience with nonconforming loans, 
booming markets and low rates of default of subprime borrowers, it appeared that 
junior tranche securities (owners of junior tranche securities would be paid only if 
owners of senior tranche were fully serviced) were also fairly safe and could be sold 
for high prices to unregulated financial players like hedge funds. 
Secondly, investment banks, as Minsky predicted, hired respectable credit rat-
ing agencies to grant investment grade status to overcollateralized senior tranches, 
disregarding the fact that underlying assets were junk. Due to conflicts of interest 
(because they were heavily paid for providing rating services to investment banks) 
and the fact that the credit agencies used the calculations of their customers (invest-
ment banks) to asses potential default risks, junk was easily and smoothly trans-
formed into rather safe securities, with high prices and low interest rates.  
Thirdly, the insurance institutions were, beside credit raters, the key players 
that provided seemingly unlimited liquidity to junk mortgage backed securities and 
collateralized debt obligations. The big insurance companies with tiny capital bases 
massively insured junk securities (nominally investment grade securities) and helped 
to validate high rating status assigned by the credit raters. Similarly, the health of the 
insurers was assessed by the credit rating agencies. By providing insurance for in-
vestment grade securities (junk actually), insurers at the same time satisfied neces-
sary conditions to acquire high credit ratings. Consequently, when subprime borrow-
ers started to default massively, agents began to suspect the credit rating status of 
nominally investment grade securities assigned by the credit raters. At the same time, 
they became aware that higher rate of default than predicted could put insufficiently 
capitalized insurers into difficulties. Consistently, credit raters downgraded the credit 
ratings of insurers. Now, the insurance of mortgage backed securities became worth-
less, because health of insurers had been called into question. In that way, mortgage 
backed securities lost their investment grade status and panic emerged. (Wray 2007).        
All in all, vicious circle was created: exotic innovations expanded supply of 
funds, banks were able to emit new loans as they moved pools of mortgage loans off 
their books, new loans increased demand for houses, pushing prices of houses up. 
Increased prices of houses justified the increased size of loans required and ever ris-
ing leverage ratio (debt to equity), since, in booming market, houses could always be 
refinanced or sold at inflated prices if Ponzi unit faced difficulties.  
With the benefit of hindsight now, everything else is history. The speculative 
frenzy ended when, because of the increased risks of subprime defaults, interest rates 
rose and house prices stopped rising. The subprime market crashed and crisis imme-
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Last but not least, it is important to notice that the new banking model of 
originate-and-distribute adds very important novelty to the dynamics of Minsky’s 
FIH. Namely, in the new “originate-and-distribute” deregulated environment, with 
obvious incentive problems, a prolonged period of prosperity might not be needed 
for Ponzi units to be created and become dominant. In this new banking practice, 
loan originators and credit rating agencies were not motivated to properly screen po-
tential borrowers and new credit enhancement strategies (overcollateralization and 
subordinated debt) became widely used techniques for the production of investment 
grade structured financial instruments out of junk assets. In this way, it is possible 
that domination of Ponzi units may take place from the very beginning of an expan-
sion phase. The only thing that is necessary is favorable trend for prices of the assets 
that are object of Ponzi-style speculation.       
 
5. The Grasshopper and the Ant Apologue 
 
Inevitably, one should answer the questions of how we should react if a crisis 
erupted, and how episodes of uncontrolled speculation should be avoided in the fu-
ture? There is no simple answer to these questions and, for the time being, due to the 
limited space, we cannot go deeper into debate. In order to give a more intuitive than 
definite answer, we decided to start with Jean de La Fontaine's fable “The Grasshop-
per and The Ant”: A grasshopper gay sang the summer away, and found herself poor 
by the winter's first roar. Of meat or of bread, not a morsel she had! So a begging she 
went, to her neighbor the ant, for the loan of some wheat, which would serve her to 
eat, till the season came round. ”I will pay you”, she says, ”on an animal's faith, dou-
ble weight in the pound ere the harvest be bound.” The ant is a friend (and here she 
might mend) little giver to lend. ”How spent you the summer?” said she, looking 
shame at the borrowing dame. ”Night and day to each comer I sang, if you please.” 
”You sang! I'm at ease; for it is plain at a glance, now, ma'am, you must dance.” 
Clearly, the grasshopper represents unscrupulous financial managers, while 
we should find regulatory authorities to act as a queen of ants, whose task is to pro-
tect honest and diligent citizens from different kind of abuses. We firmly believe that 
if the government had allowed failure of the ones who speculated and earned enor-
mous amounts of money, while, at the same time, transferred risks to other market 
participants, future generations of financial managers would have been very cautious 
and reluctant to get into this kind of game. However, in that case, contrary to La Fon-
tain’s fable, due to high complexity of the financial system and complicated net-
works of mutual debts, the grasshopper is not the only one sentenced to death. A 
great number of ants would die as well (as experience of the Great Depression 
showed). On the other hand, if the queen of ants decides to save the grasshopper, it is 
very likely that, while her subjects work very hard in order to survive, it will con-
tinue singing and enjoying its leisure time in the future. In other words, a continual 
policy of interventionism stimulates moral hazard, i.e. sends bad signals to the mar-
ket participants that risky and irresponsible behavior is being rewarded, because, no 
matter what happens, authorities would not let depression come to the scene. In a 
word, socialization of losses increases moral hazard in future and induces ever riskier 
behavior of market participants. But, on the other hand, if the system is on the verge 222  Ognjen Radonjić and Miodrag Zec 
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of crisis, abolition of rogue corporations and financial institutions is the only possible 
way to avoid deep depression. That is why, in time, after each new bailout episode, 
crises tend to erupt more frequently and tend to be more severe. The cure is in con-
tinual and, as much as possible, timely updating of financial markets regulation rules 
and regulating practices. Monetary authorities should be, if possible, only one step 
behind creative financial engineers. Corporative model of capitalism solved the prob-
lem of financing, but not the problem of managing. An open question looking for an 
answer is how to bind tight financial markets to the real sector. If we continue to go 
this way, we can expect more crises yet to come, new disruptive episodes, a rise in 
uncertainty and insecurity and more inequality in distribution of wealth. As Keynes 
warned us seven decades ago, if financial markets lose ground in the real sector and 
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